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Reconstructing the Limits of  
Schmitt’s Theory of Sovereignty:  
A Case for Law As Rhetoric,  
Not As Political Theology 
Brook Thomas* 
  The act of metaphor then was a thrust at truth and a lie, depending where you 
were: inside, safe, or outside, lost. Oedipa did not know where she was.1 
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I. 
An essay written in the United States today with “sovereignty” in the title is 
almost obligated to mention, as I am about to, Carl Schmitt. That was not always 
the case. A standard reference work for political thought published in 1987 went 
from Frederick Schiller to Joseph Schumpeter, leaving out Schmitt.2 David 
Luban’s Lexis search revealed five law review references to Schmitt from 1980 
through 1990, and 420 from 2000 through 2010, with almost twice as many from 
2006 through 2010 as in the five previous years.3 
There are multiple reasons for this increased interest, but the most obvious is 
the United States’ response to 9/11. A thinker who conceives of the political as a 
 
* Chancellor’s Professor, English, University of California, Irvine. 
1. THOMAS PYNCHON, THE CRYING OF LOT 49, at 105 (First Perennial Classics ed. 1999) 
(1965). 
2. THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, 466–67 (David Miller et al. 
eds., 1987); see Tracy B. Strong, Foreword to CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL, at ix, 
xii (George Schwab trans., Univ. Chi. Press expanded ed. 2007) (1932). 
3. David Luban, Carl Schmitt and the Critique of Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 457, 468 
(2010). 
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contest between friends and enemies and who defines the sovereign as “he who 
decides on the exception”4 is well suited for those engaging some of the most 
hotly debated legal issues in a post-9/11 world, especially because “exception” is a 
translation for Ausnahmenzustand, which in German means the “state of 
emergency” in martial law. Neoconservatives can turn to him for powerful 
intellectual justification of Bush administration policies. Leftists can use him to 
expose how liberal, pluralistic democracy’s pretensions to rule by law are built on a 
foundation of the sovereign’s exceptional use of force. 
Schmitt’s impact is evident in the call for papers for this symposium. Among 
the topics listed for “empirical inquiry” is “sacrality/profanity: investigation of 
law’s dueling ontologies, derived on the one hand from the realm of divinity and 
sovereignty (the transcendental), and on the other from the realm of disposition 
and administration (the governmental).”5 The identification of sovereignty with 
the sacred in no small measure derives from Schmitt’s claim that “[a]ll significant 
concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts.”6 
In this Article I want to test some of Schmitt’s influential claims about political 
theology, sovereignty, and the law. 
Because my approach might seem a bit idiosyncratic—if not exceptional—I 
need to take a moment to explain it. The Schmitt boom in the United States has 
two primary sources. One is American scholars trained in continental thought. 
Since Schmitt’s death in 1985, they have made his work available in translation, 
and they have responded to and explained his importance for continental thinkers 
such as Jacques Derrida, Chantel Mouffe, Étienne Balibar, and—especially—
Giorgio Agamben, who has stressed Schmitt’s engagement with Walter Benjamin. 
The other source is legal scholars like Oren Gross, Mark Tushnet, John Ferejohn, 
and Pasquale Pasquino, who rely on the other scholars’ accounts of Schmitt to 
debate his merits for understanding the legal ramifications of post-9/11 
antiterrorism policy.7 As important as that work and those debates are, I am not 
going to engage either extensively. What I want to do instead is look at an aspect 
of Schmitt’s work that both tend to neglect. The introduction to the first 
translation of Political Theology reports that, “because Schmitt was regarded in 
England and America as . . . a Nazi theoretician,”8 he had long been neglected in 
the English-speaking world. In fact, in his influential book, Constitutional 
Dictatorship, Clinton Rossiter engaged Schmitt with no mention of his Nazi 
connections.9 Rossiter dedicates his book to his former professor, Edward 
 
4. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 1 (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2005) (1922). 
5. Call for papers (on file with author). 
6. SCHMITT, supra note 4, at 36. 
7. For a summary of this debate, see William E. Scheuerman, Survey Article: Emergency Powers 
and the Rule of Law After 9/11, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 61, 64 n.11, 70 (2006). 
8. See George Schwab, Introduction to SCHMITT, supra note 4, at xl. 
9. CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP (1948). 
           
2014] A CASE FOR LAW AS RHETORIC 241 
Corwin, the famous constitutional scholar and uncompromising advocate of 
presidential power. It is no accident that Rossiter’s work, like Schmitt’s, has been 
revisited in the post-9/11 world. It is also no accident that Agamben prematurely 
dismisses Rossiter while some of the most important legal counters to Schmitt rely 
on him.10 
But it is not only the case that an American, like Rossiter, engaged Schmitt 
before the present boom. Schmitt himself cites American examples. That he does 
so is not surprising. First, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there 
was an extensive exchange between American and German-speaking thinkers 
about sovereignty. Schmitt’s work grows out of that exchange. Second, whereas 
one of Schmitt’s best American critics called the Weimar era the “most notorious 
crisis in the history of constitutional democracy,”11 a case could be made that the 
American Civil War and its Reconstruction aftermath was a pretty significant crisis 
as well, one that raised fundamental questions about sovereignty and the use of 
special powers in times of emergency. Schmitt knew this and strategically, if not 
extensively, cited American examples from this period to provide perspective for 
his own troubled times. 
My critique of Schmitt follows from placing him in that transatlantic 
tradition and evaluating his neglected comments on the American scene. My first 
goal is historical. I want to resurrect the transatlantic exchange that helped shape 
Schmitt’s ideas, explaining why the period of the Civil War and Reconstruction 
was important for theorists of sovereignty and Schmitt in particular. Given the 
limits of time and space, I will focus particularly on John W. Burgess, a now 
neglected figure, who in his day was the foremost expert on sovereignty in the 
United States. Although this part of my Article looks to the past, it has 
implications for Schmitt’s reception in post-9/11 America. Schmitt’s interventions 
into Weimar debates and his subsequent embrace of the Nazi party cause 
neoconservatives to evoke him with caution. For instance, Eric A. Posner and 
Adrian Vermeule pointedly claim that “Weimar has received too much 
attention”12 in post-9/11 debates. “Civil libertarians invoke the shadow of Weimar 
to imply, and occasionally say, that expanding government’s powers during 
emergencies will produce another Hitler. It will not, in today’s liberal democracies 
anyway . . . .”13 At the same time, neoconservatives frequently and favorably cite 
the example of Lincoln and various Reconstruction measures. In contrast, given 
Lincoln’s majestic reputation and the commendable goals of Radical 
Reconstruction, Civil War and Reconstruction examples are complicated for those 
on the left, while Schmitt’s Nazi connections make reference to him politically 
 
10. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 6–9 (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 
2005) (2003); see Scheuerman, supra note 7, at 80. 
11. John P. McCormick, Introduction to CARL SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY, at xiii 
(Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., 2004). 
12. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE 39 (2007). 
13. Id. 
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useful. What gets neglected in all this is Schmitt’s own use of American examples 
and the way in which American theorists of sovereignty at the time, like Burgess, 
viewed emergency powers. 
My second goal is more theoretical than historical, although it relies on my 
historical evidence. I use a comparison between Schmitt and Burgess to take 
exception to Schmitt’s influential claim that we should understand law as political 
theology. I will argue instead that it is more productive to affirm the traditional 
understanding of law as rhetoric. To understand law as rhetoric will, I hope, place 
some gentle pressure on one goal of this symposium, which is to place pressure on 
doing legal history by looking at law and something else, such as society, religion, 
economics, culture, etc. For instance, the call for “law as . . .” proposed imagining 
law and something else as the same phenomenon.14 But to think of “law as . . .” is 
to think metaphorically. We turn to metaphor because of a failure of self-identity. 
Metaphoric language consists of tropes, a term etymologically linked to the Greek 
word for “turn” or “turning.” We use “turns of speech” when we cannot name 
things directly. Schmitt suggests at least one implication of this insight for the law 
through his important distinction between legality and legitimacy. The legitimacy 
of rule by law, he insists, can never be found within the law itself.15 Thus, he turns 
to political theology. Recent scholars intent on challenging the widespread 
Weberian disenchantment of the law have followed him. By turning instead to 
rhetoric, I am not claiming a relationship of identity. But I am suggesting that 
political theology is not the only place to turn for an alternative to the relentless 
hermeneutics of suspicion that has characterized much recent critical legal history. 
I also want to highlight the rhetorical implications of different attempts to define 
the law metaphorically. Not all metaphors are the same. 
My rhetorical/historical approach and its use of American examples are not 
meant to downplay the importance of understanding Schmitt through a 
continental lens. In fact, my challenge to Schmitt’s political theology relies on 
Hans Blumenberg, a major—though neglected in the United States—continental 
thinker. Nonetheless, comparing Schmitt with an American predecessor can 
provide a different perspective on issues of sovereignty and political theology. For 
one, it highlights how exceptional Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty was in the 
context of the transatlantic exchange out of which it emerged. In contrast, 
Burgess’s definition was much more conventional. For him, the sovereign is “that 
which imposes the limitation.”16 But despite—or perhaps because of—its 
conventionality, Burgess’s definition can, I will argue, help us see the limits of 
Schmitt’s much more provocative definition. In my last section, I try to back up 
that claim by briefly looking at the rhetorical implications of understanding 
 
14. See Catherine L. Fisk & Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: “Law As . . .”: Theory and Method in 
Legal History, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 519 (2011) (symposium issue). 
15. McCormick, supra note 11. 
16. 1 JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY 53 (Boston, Ginn & Co. 1890). 
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sovereignty in terms of exceptions and limits for three controversial constitutional 
issues today whose roots can be traced to the Reconstruction and post-
Reconstruction era. The first is the constitutionality of the trials of those accused 
of terrorism at Guantanamo. Whereas a number of people have turned to Schmitt 
mediated through Agamben to analyze those trials, I will argue that we get a much 
better understanding of the Bush—and to a certain extent the Obama—
administration policies by tracing Burgess’s response to the landmark case of Ex 
parte Milligan, mediated through Corwin and Rossiter.17 The other two involve 
immigration, which Susan Coutin, Justin Richland, and Véronique Fortin analyze 
in depth in their essay,18 and the national debt, loosely related to Christopher 
Tomlins’ somewhat different concerns about capitalism and debt.19 
II. 
Carl Schmitt was born in 1888 and grew up a devout Roman Catholic in 
Westphalia. He studied law in Berlin, Munich, and Strasburg, moving on to an 
academic career that was interrupted by military service in World War I. Although 
Catholicism remained important for him, he was excommunicated for a second 
marriage after the church failed to recognize his divorce. His most important work 
resulted from his participation in debates over the Weimar government. Soon 
after Hitler came to power in 1933, Schmitt joined the Nazi party and held various 
official posts until 1936, when infighting ousted him from positions of power. At 
the end of World War II, he spent a year in an internment camp, refusing efforts 
at de-Nazification. Barred from academia, he continued to write, give lectures in 
Franco’s Spain, and remain intellectually connected with people interested in his 
work. Whether Schmitt’s membership in the Nazi party was opportunistic or 
sincere remains as hotly debated as the extent to which his ideas can be separated 
from his Nazi connections. What is certain is that although he remained a staunch 
conservative, in his later years he had personal correspondence with thinkers 
across the political spectrum, such as Blumenberg, Leo Strauss, Ernst Juenger, 
Jacob Taubes, and Alexander Kojeve. 
Much older than Schmitt, Burgess was born in 1844. A native of Tennessee, 
he courageously resisted enlistment in the Confederate army and fought for the 
Union. After the war, he studied at Amherst College and then in Germany. He has 
been called the “father” of American political science, both because of his 
scholarship and because of his creation of the School of Political Science at 
Columbia University.20 A practicing lawyer, he simultaneously taught at the 
 
17. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) 
18. Susan Bibler Coutin et al., Routine Exceptionality: The Plenary Power Doctrine, Immigrants, and the 
Indigenous Under U.S. Law, 4 UC IRVINE L. REV. 97, 101–05 (2014). 
19. Christopher Tomlins, Demonic Ambiguities: Enchantment and Disenchantment in Nat Turner's 
Virginia, 4 UC IRVINE L. REV. 175, 176 (2014). 
20. ALBERT SOMIT & JOSEPH TANENHAUS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICAL 
SCIENCE 3 (Irvington Publishers 1982) (1967). 
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Columbia Law School. Active in founding the Academy of Political Science and 
its major journal, he hired wisely, adding to the faculty—among others—Edwin 
Seligmen, James Harvey Robinson, Charles Beard, and William A. Dunning of the 
infamous “Dunning school” of Reconstruction studies. Burgess cemented his 
academic reputation with his monumental Political Science and Comparative 
Constitutional Law (1890), followed by influential studies of the constitutional issues 
related to the Civil War and Reconstruction. If people know of him today, what 
most know is that he, like Dunning, should not be read. No one is more 
responsible for that view than W.E.B. Du Bois, who condemns Burgess and 
Dunning in his book Black Reconstruction. With good reason, Du Bois singles out 
Burgess’s racism more than Dunning’s. Indeed, if Burgess is cited today, the 
citation is almost always to a racist passage Du Bois drew attention to years ago.21 
Yet, despite Burgess’s racism, there are reasons for reading him carefully. 
Creating a somewhat distorted account himself by calling Burgess an ex-
Confederate, Du Bois concedes that his account is “more than fair in law,” 
adding, “subtract from [him] his belief that only white people can rule, and he is in 
essential agreement with me.”22 What makes Burgess provide a fair account of the 
law of the Reconstruction era is his view of sovereignty derived from his pro-
Union beliefs and his studies in Germany. In the end, his loyalty to Germany, 
much more than the racism that offended Du Bois, discredited him in his lifetime 
because of his opposition to the United States’ entry into World War I. Before the 
war, however, he was famous enough to be named the first Roosevelt Visiting 
Professor at the University of Berlin. In Berlin 1906–1907, Burgess gave a large 
lecture course in German on the constitutional history of the United States and a 
graduate seminar in English on American constitutional law. 
Just missing direct contact with Burgess, Schmitt began his studies in Berlin 
in the fall of 1907. Even though Schmitt did not have direct contact with Burgess, 
his theories of sovereignty came out of the transatlantic exchange that influenced 
and was influenced by the Columbia professor who dedicated his major work to 
Professor Johann Gustav Droysen. The influence of Germany on nineteenth-
century America is well documented, but the exchange was not confined to one 
direction. There was a practical reason for German interest in American 
constitutional history and theory. German unification had created a federal state. 
German theorists, therefore, turned to the United States and its efforts to 
understand sovereignty in a federal context.23 Prior to the Civil War, most people 
agreed with The Federalist Papers that in the United States sovereignty was divided 
between the nation and individual states. This belief was affirmed in Chisholm v. 
Georgia (1793), in which the Court declared that “[t]he United States [is] sovereign 
as to all the powers of Government actually surrendered: Each State in the Union 
 
21. See, e.g., PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM 75 (photo. reprint 2008) (1988). 
22. W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 720, 726 (1935). 
23. See, e.g., SIEGFRIED BRIE, DER BUNDESSTAAT (Leipzig, Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann 
1874); see also HUGO PREUSS, GEMEINDE, STAAT, REICH (photo. reprint 1964) (1889). 
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is sovereign as to all the powers reserved.”24 Joseph Story explained how 
sovereignty could be divided by noting two different uses of the term. Sovereignty 
in “its largest sense is meant, supreme, absolute, uncontrollable power, the jus 
summi imperii, the absolute right to govern.”25  But the term is also used in a more 
limited sense to refer to “such political powers, as in the actual organization of the 
particular state or nation are to be exclusively exercised by certain public 
functionaries, without the control of any superior authority.”26 For Story, as for 
Daniel Webster and Lincoln, the nation was sovereign in the absolute sense, and 
individual states in the more limited sense. 
That view was challenged by John C. Calhoun, who argued that sovereignty 
could not be divided. Sovereignty, he claimed, is “an entire thing;—to divide, is,—
to destroy it.”27 For him, individual states alone were sovereign. Calhoun 
responded to the Constitution’s explicit division of powers between the national 
and state governments by distinguishing governmental functions held, for 
instance, by the executive and legislative branches, from sovereignty itself. 
Emanating from the sovereign state, but not identical to it, these governmental 
powers could be divided, as they had been when states delegated some of their 
capacities to the federal government. But the delegation was by no means a 
cession of sovereignty. 
Francis Lieber, whose first academic position was in Calhoun’s South 
Carolina and later taught at Columbia, agreed that sovereignty could not be 
divided. But he located it in the nation, not individual states. He did so by relying 
on two ideas he brought with him from Germany. Despite their disagreements, 
both Calhoun and Webster believed that the people, not a monarch, were 
sovereign. In Germany, however, reaction to the French Revolution’s claim to 
popular sovereignty led to the idea that the state, not the people or a monarch, 
was sovereign. To be sure, the state was linked to the people, but not, as 
conceived of in the United States, as an aggregate of contracting individuals. It 
was instead a Gesamtperson, whose character was greater than the sum of its parts 
embodying a corporate personality. Because of linguistic confusion caused by the 
claims of individual “states” to be sovereign, Lieber described this sovereignty to 
be located in the nation, not the state. Nonetheless, with the idea of an organic 
nation-state, he tried to counter the feeling described by Tocqueville that “[t]he 
sovereignty of the Union is an abstract being that is attached to only a few external 
objects,” while that of the states 
 
24. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 (1793). 
25. HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, LECTURES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33 (Richmond, 
Shepherd & Colin 1843). 
26. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 207, at 192 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). 
27. JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT 146 (Richard K. Cralle ed., 
Charleston, Steam Power-Press of Walker and James 1851). 
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comes before all the senses; one comprehends it without difficulty; one 
sees it act at each instant. . . . The sovereignty of Union is the work of art. 
The sovereignty of the states is natural; it exists by itself without effort, 
like the authority of the father of a family.28 
Nathaniel Hawthorne expresses similar sentiments, describing the country’s 
“anomaly of two allegiances (of which that of the State comes nearest home to a 
man’s feelings, and includes the altar and the hearth, while the General 
Government claims his devotion only to an airy mode of law, and has no symbol 
but a flag).”29 Lincoln tries to alter such feelings in the First Inaugural by 
describing national “bonds of affection . . . stretching from every battle-field, and 
patriot grave, to every living heart and hearthstone, all over this broad land.”30 In a 
different register, Lieber’s idea of a collective people embodied in an organic 
nation-state tried to do the same. 
With the victory of the Union, Lieber’s argument would seem to have 
prevailed, and to a certain extent it did, although—as we will see—the question of 
national and state sovereignty remained a thorny one. It also remained a subject 
for debate in the German-speaking world. The German Confederation created in 
1815 consisted of forty sovereign states. Like the United States under the Articles 
of Confederation, it was a Staatenbund, not a Bundesstaat. But, as the move toward 
German unification took force, the relationship between these states and a federal 
state was unresolved. In 1853, Georg Waitz developed an influential theory of 
divided sovereignty, similar to antebellum theories in the United States. But 
Bismarck’s political push toward unification placed pressure on that theory. If 
Waitz argued that individual states and the federal state were sovereign in different 
spheres, the question arose as to who determines the boundaries of those spheres. 
In 1868, Georg Meyer’s answer was that a state is sovereign when it has the power 
to determine its own jurisdiction. With the formation of the German Empire four 
years later, Meyer added that sovereignty lies in the constitution-making power, 
which is superior to both central and state governments. Or, put another way, lack 
of a legal superior constitutes sovereignty. As Paul Laband put it in 1876, if you 
want to know who is sovereign, you simply ask who has the power to determine 
the limits of jurisdiction for a community.31 
Although this theory of undivided sovereignty had many followers, it was 
 
28. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 157–58 (Harvey C. Mansfield & 
Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835). 
29. Nathaniel Hawthorne, Chiefly About War-Matters, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1862, at 48. 
30. 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 271 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
31. Recently, a number of scholars have argued that jurisdiction is more important than 
sovereignty. See, e.g., Shaun McVeigh & Sundhya Pahuja, Rival Jurisdictions: The Promise and Loss of 
Sovereignty, in AFTER SOVEREIGNTY: ON THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 97, 97–114 
(Charles Barbour & George Pavlich eds., 2010). Yet in this period, the two are intricately related 
because sovereignty was defined as the power to determine jurisdiction. See BRADIN CORMACK, A 
POWER TO DO JUSTICE 288–89 (2007); Juris-Dictions, ENGLISH LANGUAGE NOTES, Fall/Winter 
2010, at 1. 
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challenged by Otto von Gierke. Gierke’s views of sovereignty grew out of his 
extensive research into the history of German laws of associations, including 
groups like medieval guilds. His research challenged a number of assumptions of 
those trained primarily in Roman law and the Roman influence on the Napoleonic 
code. Romans, according to Gierke, conceived of both an absolute and indivisible 
person and state. The state was unlimited in the realm of public law, and the 
individual person in that of private law. But this left no human associations 
between the individual and the state. In contrast, German Genossenschaftrecht 
focused on the communal groups above the individual and below the state. These 
groups, comprising what today we would call civil society, were as important for 
an individual’s sense of identity as his or her relation to the state. Indeed, for 
Gierke, “‘men everywhere and at all times has borne a double character, that of an 
individual as such and that of a member of a community.’”32 Similarly, sovereignty 
can have a double character. For Gierke, the state does not rule over the law or 
the law over the state. Instead, the two are equal powers, inconceivable without 
one another. 
Extending Gierke’s work, Hugo Preuss raised important questions about the 
idea of absolute sovereignty by looking at relations above and below the state. 
First, he argued that it was incompatible with developments in international law, 
which would place certain restrictions on individual states. Second, it was 
incompatible with the existence of communal groups within the state who have 
existences, at least in part, independent of the state. As a result, Preuss argued that 
the idea of sovereignty, while useful to describe the absolutist state of Bodin, 
should be abandoned in relation to the modern state. 
Gierke and his influence on Preuss are important for my argument for two 
reasons. First, both are prime targets of Schmitt in Political Theology. True to his 
Roman Catholic upbringing, Schmitt strongly believed in an absolute, indivisible 
sovereign. He is especially dismissive of Preuss. Helping to frame the Weimar 
Constitution, Preuss, staying true to the “associationalist” beliefs he learned from 
Gierke, tried to make sure that communities between the state and the individual 
had sufficient power. For Schmitt those assurances devastatingly weakened the 
power of the state. The second reason for Gierke’s importance has to do with the 
transatlantic exchange about sovereignty that I have briefly outlined. Bringing us 
almost to the start of Schmitt’s career, it is analyzed and explicated in detail in the 
first book by Charles E. Merriam, Jr., considered the “father” of behavioral 
political science. Merriam wrote much of the book while studying with Gierke in 
Berlin. He was sent there by Dunning, who was his dissertation director. At the 
time, Dunning was turning his attention from Reconstruction to a multivolume 
history of political theory. Merriam also acknowledges the importance of seminars 
he took with Burgess, who, reversing the direction of Dunning’s career, was at 
 
32. CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM, JR., HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY SINCE 
ROUSSEAU 59 (1900) (quoting Otto von Gierke). 
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work on Reconstruction and the Constitution, published in 1902, two years after 
Merriam’s History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau.33 It is time, therefore, to 
turn to the relation between Burgess’s theory of state sovereignty and his 
understanding of Reconstruction. 
III. 
According to Burgess, a proper answer to legal questions of Reconstruction 
and its aftermath cannot be achieved without clarifying the “proper conception of 
what a ‘State’ is in a system of federal government.”34 Confusion arises because of 
the tendency to confound the idea of a “State” in such a system with a 
state pure and simple. Until the distinction between the two is clearly 
seen and firmly applied, no real progress can be made in the theory and 
practice of the federal system of government. Now the fundamental 
principle of a state pure and simple is sovereignty, the original, innate, 
and legally unlimited power to command and enforce obedience by the 
infliction of penalties for disobedience. On the other hand, the nature of 
a “State” in a system of federal government is a very different thing. Such 
a “State” is a local self-government, under the supremacy of the general 
constitution, and possessed of residuary powers.35 
Individual states, Burgess felt, should be called “[c]ommonwealth[s]”36 or placed 
in quotation marks to distinguish them from real states. 
Burgess’s views of sovereignty made him a harsh critic of Lincoln’s and 
Andrew Johnson’s presidential plan for Reconstruction. First, he felt that the 
Constitution clearly indicated that Congress, not the executive branch, should 
have presided over Reconstruction. Second, he dismissed Lincoln’s insistence that 
the rebellious states never left the Union, that it was not states that rebelled but 
the act of combinations of disloyal persons. In contrast, Burgess felt that Charles 
Sumner’s doctrine of “state suicide”37 was “sound political science and correct 
constitutional law.”38 Since individual states depend on the nation for their 
existence, the moment rebellious states voted for secession, they ceased to exist as 
states. Their populations and territories continued to be under the control of the 
nation, but, as with any populations or territories not organized as states, they 
were “subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress”39 and could be readmitted 
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to the Union as states only in accord with procedures outlined in the Constitution 
that gave special powers to Congress over territories.40 
Given their belief that “states” themselves had never left the Union, 
Presidents Lincoln and Johnson felt that the major work needed for 
Reconstruction was simply restoration of local governments within the states. 
Given his belief in the doctrine of “‘state’ suicide,”41 Burgess felt that was 
inadequate. In fact, for him, even Radical Reconstruction was not radical enough. 
To be sure, the South was divided into military districts, but “states” persisted 
under what Dunning called the “theory of forfeited rights.”42 The boundaries and 
jurisdiction of the formerly rebellious states remained in place, but were 
temporarily in “suspended animation.”43 
In disagreeing with the actual course that Reconstruction took, Burgess did 
not confine his criticism to congressional Republicans. He also targeted the 
Supreme Court. For instance, in Texas v. White (1869), Chief Justice Chase, 
Lincoln’s former secretary of the treasury, memorably declared, “The 
Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of 
indestructible States.”44 When Justice Matthews in the 1884 Virginia Coupon Cases 
cited Chase, Burgess compared Matthews’s logic to “Dogberry’s charge to the 
watchmen in Much Ado.”45 Similarly, when the Slaughter House (1873) majority 
insisted on distinguishing between national and state citizenship and the privileges 
and immunities both afford, Burgess called the opinion “entirely erroneous,”46 
lamenting that the Court had “thrown away the great gain in the domain of civil 
liberty won by the terrible exertions of the nation in the appeal to arms.”47 For 
Burgess, the past of slavery proved that we cannot trust individual states, which 
are only local forms of government, to protect civil liberties. On the contrary, “[i]f 
history ever taught anything, it is that civil liberty is national in origin, content and 
sanction.”48 The Civil War was a turning point in history because, prior to it, the 
United States was “lagging in the march of modern civilization”49 due to 
“[s]lavery”50 and “State sovereignty.”51 But with “emancipation”52 and 
“nationalization”53 the United States asserted “its supremacy, forevermore.”54 
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Burgess’s views on Reconstruction both shaped and were shaped by his 
theory of the nation, the state, and government. For him, a nation has geographic 
and ethnic unity. Geographic unity means a “territory separated from other 
territory”55 by a natural geographic boundary. Ethnic unity is a “population having 
a common language and literature, a common tradition and history, a common 
custom and a common consciousness of rights and wrongs. . . . Where the 
geographic and ethnic unities coincide, or very nearly coincide, the nation is 
almost sure to organize itself politically, —to become a state.”56 
Relying on Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, Burgess defines a state as “a particular 
portion of mankind viewed as an organized unit.”57 States have four 
characteristics. They are “all-comprehensive.”58 Their organization “embraces all 
persons, natural or legal, and all associations of persons.”59 There are no “stateless 
persons within the territory of the state.”60 A state is also “exclusive.”61 The state 
may constitute “two or more governments”62 and “assign to each a distinct sphere 
of action . . . but there cannot be two organizations of the state for the same 
population and within the same territory.”63 Third, “the state is permanent.”64 But 
of all these characteristics, the most essential is sovereignty. Sovereign power, 
Burgess insists, must be unlimited. Sovereignty is “that which imposes the 
limitation.”65 
Very similar to Laband’s, Meyer’s, and others’, Burgess’s definition is not at 
all exceptional for anyone familiar with the German-speaking thought of the time. 
But, because of American debates, Burgess, more than others, stressed the 
distinction between the state and the governments that serve it. Sovereignty rests 
in the state, not in governments. “[A] great deal of confusion,”66 he insists, results 
from “the failure to distinguish between the state and the two governments”67 of a 
federal system. 
The individual is not a citizen of either government, but of the state back of 
both. He derives his citizenship, with all its immunities and rights, from 
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observing and protecting those immunities and rights, each in the sphere 
assigned to it by the state.68 
This distinction between the state and the government explains why 
Burgess’s insistence on unlimited sovereign power is not inconsistent with the 
Anglo-American tradition’s belief that civil liberties can be protected only by 
limiting governmental power. Burgess acknowledges that governments can 
threaten civil liberties. But the unlimited power of the state limits governments. 
“[T]he government is not the sovereign organization of the state. Back of the 
government lies the constitution; and back of the constitution the original 
sovereign state, which ordains the constitution both of government and of 
liberty.”69 According to Burgess, Laband, Otto von Holst, and Georg Jellinick 
understand this attribute of sovereignty through their studies of the American 
system. 
There is, however, one situation in which Burgess’s distinction between the 
government, the constitution, and the state temporarily breaks down. When, in 
time of “war and public danger,”70 the “life of the state is threatened,”71 the 
“central government may temporarily suspend the constitutional guarantees of 
individual liberty and rule absolutely; i.e., assume the whole power of the state, the 
sovereignty.”72 As Burgess makes clear, there are notable precedents for 
suspending the constitution in order to save the state. But instead of relying on the 
obvious example of “the great Roman state”73 or those “formed out of the 
amalgamation of Teutonic and Roman ideas,”74 he prefers to evoke the example 
of  “the pure Germanic state.”75 Citing Caesar, he describes how “the ancient 
liberty-loving Germans,”76 when needed, suspended “government by the 
assemblies of the freemen”77 and allowed the “complete dictatorship of the 
duke.”78 Like every Teutonic state before it, the United States, according to 
Burgess, has provisions for such a “temporary dictatorship.”79 For instance, 
noting that “Congress has the power to ordain universal military duty in the 
United States, and provide for calling the entire population into the service of the 
United States,”80 he concludes that the “entire population would be made subject 
to the rules and regulations governing the army and navy . . . without regard to the 
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system of civil liberty.”81 Admitting that “[t]his would . . . be an extraordinary 
procedure,”82 he, nonetheless, insists on its constitutionality.83 
Burgess was, therefore, an ardent supporter of Lincoln’s actions during the 
war, as well as the use of military force to ensure loyalty by former Confederates 
during Reconstruction. Despite his love of civil liberties, he was also a sharp critic 
of the most important civil liberties case to come out of the Civil War. During the 
war, Lambdin B. Milligan, an outspoken critic of Lincoln’s war effort, was accused 
of conspiring with the Confederates. Denied habeas corpus, he was tried by a 
military tribunal in his home state of Indiana and sentenced to hang. Not hanged 
during the war, he appealed his case to the Supreme Court. In Ex parte Milligan, 
the Court freed him in a unanimous decision, ruling that the president had no 
authority to try a civilian in military courts when civil courts were open. According 
to Justice David Davis, who delivered the Court’s opinion, 
No graver question was ever considered by this court, nor one which 
more nearly concerns the rights of the whole people . . . No doctrine, 
involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of 
man than that any of [the Constitution’s] provisions can be suspended 
during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads 
directly to anarchy or despotism . . . .84 
To the objection that the military commission was justified by martial law, 
Davis replied, “If this were true, it could be well said that a country, preserved at 
the sacrifice of all the cardinal principles of liberty, is not worth the cost of 
preservation.”85 
Soon after World War I, Charles Warren noted that Ex parte Milligan had 
been “long recognized as one of the bulwarks of American liberty.”86 Soon after 
World War II, Allan Nevins ventured that “[t]he heart of this decision is the heart 
of the difference between the United States of America and Nazi Germany or 
Communist Russia.”87 But at the time, the decision was controversial. First, it 
seemed retroactively to declare the military trial of Lincoln’s assassins 
unconstitutional. Second, it raised questions about trying Jefferson Davis in a 
military court. Third, although the Court unanimously declared the military 
tribunal authorized by the president unlawful, it split over another, extremely 
contentious, issue. Five justices ruled that not only the president, but also 
Congress, had no constitutional power to create military tribunals of the sort that 
tried Milligan. Their opinion provoked a strong dissent from the other four 
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under the Constitution,” to authorize military trials, even when civil courts were 
open.88 
Many worried that the majority’s ruling would hamstring Congress’s plans 
for Radical Reconstruction. The Republican press went so far as to compare Ex 
parte Milligan to Dred Scott as an example of the Supreme Court’s catering to 
Southern interests. The comparison was not completely unfounded. Milligan, like 
Dred Scott, limited congressional power. Dred Scott overruled the Missouri 
Compromise, which gave Congress power over U.S. territories. Milligan limited 
Congress’s power to establish military tribunals to try civilians. Both controversial 
rulings were made in what at the time were considered dicta, not necessary for the 
outcome of the case, by a five-justice majority. Furthermore, both majorities 
justified their rulings in the name of civil liberties. If Milligan guaranteed citizens 
the right to be tried in civil courts, Dred Scott was the first Supreme Court decision 
to evoke the Bill of Rights to overturn congressional legislation. It did so when 
Justice Taney cited the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to argue that 
the Missouri Compromise deprived a U.S. citizen of “his liberty or property, 
merely because he came himself or brought his property [a slave] into a particular 
Territory of the United States.”89 
That a case Nevins calls a “great triumph for the civil liberties of Americans 
in time of war or internal dissension”90 was compared to Dred Scott by defenders 
of African Americans indicates the extent to which proponents of Radical 
Reconstruction believed in the authority of the national state. Burgess too felt that 
the decision was very bad political science: 
It is devoutly to be hoped that the decision of the Court may never be 
subjected to the strain of actual war. If, however, it should be, we may 
safely predict that it will necessarily be disregarded. In time of war and 
public danger the whole power of the state must be vested in the general 
government, and the constitutional liberty of the individual must be 
sacrificed so far as the government finds it necessary for the preservation 
of the life and security of the state. This is the experience of political 
history and the principle of political science.91 
For Burgess, “[t]he practices of the Administration are, therefore, to be 
considered as the precedents of the Constitution in civil war rather than the 
opinion of Court.”92 Picked up by Corwin, Burgess’s views on Milligan have 
exerted influence long after he himself has been forgotten. To cite just one 
example, Mark E. Neely, Jr., in his Pulitzer Prize-winning book on Lincoln’s 
record on civil liberties, strategically quotes the same passage from Burgess used 
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by Corwin in a chapter called “The Irrelevance of the Milligan Decision.”93 A 
number of presidents, able to evoke the majestic example of Lincoln, have indeed 
acted as if his practices are the true precedent. 
Those presidents, or their defenders, can cite another of Burgess’s 
pronouncements on the case to justify their actions. As much as Burgess disagrees 
with the Court’s decision, he also points out that it recognizes “occasions upon 
which the government can establish martial law, i.e. suspend all the constitutional 
guaranties of individual liberty.”94 This is precisely the point John Yoo makes 
about Milligan. According to Yoo, “[t]he Court recognized . . . that the 
Constitution grants the government the power to respond to attack, and that this 
includes the power to suspend habeas corpus or impose military rule in areas 
under attack”; Yoo goes on to note that “Milligan’s protections do not reach 
citizens who have actually joined enemy forces. Nor do they extend to detainees, 
citizen or not, at the front or on battlefields abroad.”95 If they had, Confederate 
soldiers—all of whom, according to Lincoln, were still American citizens—would 
have had to be tried in civilian courts rather than handled by the military. 
Compared to Burgess, Yoo is temperate, not going so far as explicitly to proclaim 
that “the President must have despotic power when he wages war. The safety, the 
life perhaps, of the state requires it.”96 
IV. 
Schmitt just missed meeting Burgess when he began his studies in Berlin, but 
his understanding of the American system registers Burgess’s indirect influence. 
Like many German speakers, Schmitt was fascinated by Calhoun, whose 
“theoretical significance for the concepts of a constitutional theory of the 
federation,” he declared, “[was] . . . still great and in no way settled by the fact that 
in the war of secession the Southern states were defeated.”97 What attracted 
Schmitt, however, was not Calhoun’s doctrine of states’ rights, but his belief that 
sovereignty was absolute and indivisible. In fact, Schmitt’s understanding of 
Calhoun’s historical impact is closer to what Burgess argued should have been the 
case than what actually occurred. Although, as we have seen, the Supreme Court 
continued to grant limited sovereignty to individual states, Schmitt believed that 
after the Civil War, states were simply “organizational components of extensive 
legislative autonomy and self-government.”98 Schmitt’s source turned out to be a 
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book edited by Columbia University President N. Murray Butler, who was 
profoundly influenced by Burgess.99 
That Schmitt, a proponent of a strong central government, would want to 
believe this view of the American scene is not surprising. But much more 
important than Calhoun for his interventions into German debates was Lincoln. 
In Die Diktator, Schmitt provides comprehensive historical analysis of the 
constitutional dictatorship from the time of the Romans to the early twentieth 
century alluded to by Burgess. He distinguishes between a kommissarische Diktator, 
one who suspends the constitution in order to restore it, and a souveräne Diktator, 
one who suspends it to change it.100 If Cromwell is a prime example of the latter, 
the advocate of government of the people, by the people, and for the people is the 
prime, recent example of the former. Lincoln believed he had to suspend civil 
liberties because people intent on destroying the Constitution evoked its 
protections to further their aims. Convinced that Germany faced a similar 
situation, Schmitt felt that Lincoln was perfectly justified in suspending the 
Constitution in order to save it. Whether Lincoln acted as Schmitt thought he did 
is open to debate. Most of Lincoln’s defenders today deny that he actually 
suspended the Constitution. Schmitt, however, was relying on views held by some 
of the most respected figures of the time. For instance, in his influential American 
Commonwealth, Lord Bryce cites a widely circulated statement Lincoln allegedly 
made to Salmon Chase, who would later become Chief Justice and write the 
minority opinion in Milligan: “These rebels are violating the Constitution to 
destroy the Union. I will violate the Constitution if necessary to save the Union; I 
suspect, Chase, that our Constitution is going to have a rough time of it before we 
get done with this row.”101 Similarly, Dunning in Essays on the Civil War and 
Reconstruction devotes an entire section to “[t]he Presidential Dictatorship,”102 
adding later, in an uncritical tone, “In the interval between April 12 and July 4, 
1861, a new principle thus appeared in the constitutional system of the United 
States, namely, that of a temporary dictatorship.”103 Dunning even anticipates 
Tushnet’s claim, inspired by Schmitt, that restraints on executive power during a 
state of emergency come from public opinion, not rule by law. The only “limit”104 
on Lincoln’s dictatorial power, Dunning observes, “was not the clear expressions 
of the organic law, but the forbearance of a distracted people.”105 
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Thus, it is no surprise that in discussing martial law, Schmitt cites Ex parte 
Milligan to justify the use of military tribunals. Paying no attention to the majority 
opinion declaring them unconstitutional, he focuses, as does Yoo, on the Court’s 
recognition of times when they are permissible. Most likely Schmitt did not read 
the entire decision. But the sources he relies upon are revealing. One is James 
Wilford Garner, a member of the “Dunning school” of Reconstruction studies, 
whose account of Mississippi Du Bois singles out for its fairness. A professor at 
the University of Illinois, Garner had a distinguished career, being named the 
Hyde lecturer in French universities in 1921 and holding a similar visiting position 
at the University of Calcutta. He wrote a comparative study of the German war 
code, and used his understanding of the Civil War and Reconstruction to evaluate 
Woodrow Wilson’s crackdown on civil liberties during World War I, just as 
Dunning did in a widely read comparison of Wilson and Lincoln. Indeed, Wilson 
himself wrote on the question of Reconstruction and sovereignty and reviewed 
Burgess’s work. 
Another of Schmitt’s sources was William Winthrop, a professor of law at 
West Point, who noted that the validity of military tribunals was so widely 
recognized that they were allowed to decide over two thousand cases during the 
Civil War and Reconstruction.106 A third was Military Government and Martial Law, 
written by William E. Birkheimer, who based his book on research he conducted 
after he was asked to provide legal justification for his commanding officer’s 
declaration of martial law in the Pacific Northwest to protect Chinese from violent 
intimidation in 1886.107 Distinguishing between military government, which is 
military control of enemy territory abroad, and martial law, which is a suspension 
of civil law at home, Birkheimer evokes the precedent of Milligan to justify military 
commissions at the same time that he praises the wisdom of Lincoln’s course 
during the war.108 Significantly, for him the Reconstruction Acts were justified 
only as declarations of martial law.109 To the objection that technically 
Reconstruction was during a time of peace, he argues that, in fact, the South was 
in a “state of latent rebellion.”110 He goes on to argue that if the military had used 
the full force it was authorized to use, the country would have been spared the 
“disagreeable experience [that] followed.”111 Almost the same point made by 
Burgess, it is one that certainly would have impressed Schmitt, who tried to 
convince Germans to use extraordinary powers to avoid a crisis of even more 
severity. 
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V. 
As Schmitt’s references to the United States indicate, he has numerous 
similarities with Burgess. Both were practicing lawyers as well as theorists. Both 
assumed that sovereignty rested in individual nations that ideally had a 
homogeneous ethnic make-up. This belief contributed to their racism. It also led 
them to advocate centralization. Although both worked within federal systems, 
neither recognized the sovereignty of individual “states” or “lands.” For both, 
sovereignty was indivisible, absolute, and prior to rule by law. This meant that 
both defended suspension of the constitutional order if necessary to save the state. 
It also meant that, for both, legality alone was not enough to legitimate the state. 
One of Schmitt’s most important contributions to any consideration of “law 
as . . .” is his distinction between “legality” and “legitimacy.” Legality is gesetzmässig. 
Legitimacy is rechtmässig.112 Legality is the realm of the bureaucrat and is concerned 
with establishing a set of abstract, value-neutral, procedural norms. Legitimacy is 
concerned with questions of right and pays attention to the concrete demands of 
life. A legal system, Schmitt argues, can never find true legitimacy in abstract 
legality. Burgess agreed. For instance, he favorably cites von Holtz, the German-
born expert on the U.S. Constitution, when he mocks the “‘canonizing of the 
constitution,’ i.e., the making of a political bible out of it.”113 A political system, 
Burgess insists “cannot be perpetuated simply through the guaranty contained in 
its written constitution.” Instead, “[w]e must go back of the constitution,” to find 
the true foundation of the state.114 
Because for Burgess, in the end, the Constitution was not the foundation of 
the state, he disagreed with an attorney for Milligan, who argued that the president 
“exercise[s] no authority whatever but that which the Constitution of the country 
gives him. Our system knows no authority beyond or above the law.”115 Likewise, 
he disagreed when another of Milligan’s lawyers, the Attorney General for 
ineffective President Buchanan, claimed that “[a] violation of law on pretence of 
saving such a government as ours is not self-preservation, but suicide.”116 On the 
contrary, he would have agreed with Justice Jackson’s dissent in a landmark civil 
liberties case soon after World War II that used a legal technicality to overturn the 
conviction of a hate-spouting Nazi priest. Having recently served as prosecutor at 
the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal, Justice Jackson pointed out the danger of 
letting people like the priest exploit our protection of civil liberties in order to 
destroy our democratic form of government: “There is a danger that, if the Court 
does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert 
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the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”117 Discussing Milligan, Burgess 
contrasts the proper “practical” response with the mistaken “judicial” response.118 
Similarly, Schmitt argues that value neutrality in legal systems has no place when 
its enemies push it to “the point of system suicide.”119 
Those who agree that legality alone cannot serve as the foundation of rule by 
law seek legitimacy somewhere other than in the forms of the law. As similar as 
they are in this respect, Burgess and Schmitt seek it in different realms. Schmitt 
turns to political theology, while Burgess turns to political science, one that he felt 
could be based on scientific reason. Confidently announcing the “beginning of the 
modern political era,”120 Burgess made the following declaration: 
At last the state knows itself and is able to take care of itself. The fictions, 
the makeshifts, the temporary supports, have done their work, and done 
it successfully. They are now swept away. The structure stands upon its 
own foundation. The state, the realization of the universal in man, in 
sovereign organization over the particular, is at last established,–the 
product of the progressive revelation of the human reason through 
history.121 
A proper understanding of the state depends upon a scientific exploration of the 
“domains of geography and ethnography, the womb of constitutions and of 
revolutions.”122 
Today, it is all too easy to recognize how Burgess’s turn to geography and 
ethnology links him to the period’s notorious scientific racism that offended Du 
Bois. Burgess strongly believed that, for the government to fulfill the state’s duty 
to protect the civil liberties of its citizens, political rights had to be restricted. 
Convinced that the Teutonic people are “particularly endowed with the capacity 
for establishing national states,”123 he concludes that “in a state whose population 
is composed of a variety of nationalities the Teutonic element, when dominant, 
should never surrender the balance of political power.”124 The “exercise of 
political power”125 is not “a right of man,”126 and non-Teutonic elements should 
be allowed to exercise it “only after the state shall have nationalized them 
politically.”127 Whereas it is unfair to delay such nationalization, it is unwise to 
“hasten the enfranchisement of those not yet ethnically qualified.”128 Indeed, one 
reason Burgess advocated military rule during Reconstruction was because he so 
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strongly opposed African American suffrage. To be sure, there is some truth to his 
claim that radical Republicans insisted on giving the vote to freedmen in order to 
guarantee Republican rule in the South. But Burgess’s response to that political 
maneuver was extreme: 
From the point of view of sound political science, the imposition of 
universal negro suffrage upon the Southern communities, in some of 
which the negroes were in a large majority, was one of the ‘blunder-
crimes’ of the century. There is something natural in the subordination of 
an inferior race to a superior race, even to the point of enslavement of 
the inferior race, but there is nothing natural in the opposite.129 
As Schmitt’s example demonstrates, the turn to political theology does not 
guard against racism. Nonetheless, for some it provides a much better explanation 
of the workings of state power than attempts, like Burgess’s, to provide the 
modern Rechtstaat with a secure foundation in scientific rationality. Thus, 
conservative Schmitt has joined the honored company of leftist twentieth-century 
thinkers who challenge progressive accounts of the triumph of rule by law as a 
move from barbarism to civilization. Foucault, for instance, insists that “the law is 
a calculated and relentless pleasure, delight in the promised blood, which permits 
the perpetual instigation of new dominations and the staging of meticulously 
repeated scenes of violence.”130 Benjamin, with his widely discussed “Critique of 
Violence,” links law’s inherent violence to religious ritual. Benjamin, in turn, knew 
and was influenced by Schmitt.131 They both argue that to understand the law, we 
need to take into account what Derrida, in his own influential essay, calls “The 
Mystical Foundations of Authority.”132 The attempt to transform law into a set of 
value-free normative rules is to forget its sacred violent origins. We indulge in that 
act of forgetting, we are told, at our own peril, and Schmitt’s political theology, 
especially for those associated with the journal Telos, has become a vital tool in 
diagnosing our present malaise. As Russell A. Berman (recent president of the 
MLA) and Michael Marder put it, the “century of secular universalisms leaves us 
in the state of a general and all-encompassing nihilism.”133 With unmistakable 
echoes of the New Left, they contrast the “bureaucratic-legalistic” model of rule 
by law and its abstract proceduralism to the true legitimacy of a political 
community. Yet, like Benjamin, they search for hope in our situation. In “Theses 
on the Philosophy of History,” Benjamin, alluding to Schmitt, describes the task 
of bringing about a “real state of emergency [Ausnahmezustand ]” that “will 
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improve our position in the struggle against Fascism.”134 Similarly, Berman and 
Marder insist that “the collapse of everything that went under the name of the 
New World Order could be a harbinger of ample opportunities for imagining new 
and competing forms of legitimacy. Such would be the event of legitimacy in the 
eclipse of legality.”135 
I fully agree that neither efforts to produce a set of value-free procedural 
norms nor those to ground law in scientific rationality are adequate to convince 
people of the legitimacy of the state. As Lincoln knew, that goal requires an 
effective appeal, which is why he evoked “bonds of affection” encompassing 
battlefields, patriot graves, hearts, and hearthstones. If legality is more akin to the 
realm of reason, legitimacy has affinities with the realm of myth. It requires 
appeals to tradition and renewable symbols and stories of founding moments. 
That said, I find appeals, like Berman’s, to Schmitt’s political theology as flawed as 
Burgess’s appeal to political science. 
The great myth of the enlightenment might have been the belief that human 
beings could transcend the need for myth and place human institutions on a 
rational foundation. But not all myths are the same. We still need to be wary of 
what Ernst Cassirer, responding to Nazi Germany, called various “myths of 
state.”136 As Blumenberg puts in the title of one of his most important books, we 
need to work on and with myth.137 For that reason it is premature to dismiss the 
modern Rechtstaat simply because of its inability to generate its own rational 
foundation. If all human institutions had to demonstrate foundations in reason, 
we would have very few institutions left. At times, perhaps, it is rational not to 
demand too much rationality. Likewise, even if law had its origin in the sacred and 
even though many people employ religious metaphors to describe the law, it does 
not follow that we have to understand law today as a form of secularized theology. 
There are alternatives. 
To give one example from the historical period I am treating, Wilson, in his 
review of Burgess, draws on a distinction very similar to Schmitt’s between legality 
and legitimacy. Praising Burgess’s logical understanding of constitutional law, 
which deals with “such part of political life as is operative within the forms of 
law,” Wilson faults his understanding of “the actual facts of political life, the actual 
phenomena of state growth.”138 Wilson does not, however, reject Burgess’s move 
to political science. He simply gives a very different account of what it entails. 
According to Wilson, political science deals with aspects of political life “lying 
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entirely outside the thought of the lawyer,” such as the way “states come into 
existence, take historic shape, create governments and institutions, and at pleasure 
change or discard what forms or laws they must in order to achieve 
development.”139 Burgess’s limitation in dealing with those aspects is registered in 
his style. While he writes in the “language of science,” political science demands 
the “language of literature.”140 Wilson admits that great political scientists do not 
“pretend to be making literature.”141 Nonetheless, he goes on, “they have no 
choice; if they do not write literature, they do not write truth. For political science 
cannot be truthfully constructed except by the literary method . . . .”142 
As a literary critic, I am tempted to enlist Wilson to join numerous law and 
literature scholars to argue for seeing law as literature. But elsewhere I have 
identified various problems with that move, including the lack of clarity about 
what we mean by literature.143 It is, for example, not clear precisely what Wilson 
understands by the “language of literature.” I want to propose, instead, that we 
understand law, as it has been since the Greeks, as rhetoric. There is of course 
little new in that claim, and understanding law as rhetoric will produce neither the 
certainty that Burgess wanted nor the decisiveness that Schmitt desired. It is also 
no sure guard against dangerous myths of state. Nonetheless, insofar as it 
acknowledges the need for persuasion, it allows for Blumenberg’s work on and 
with myth. Indeed, some reasons for making this claim come into clearer focus 
when we play Burgess’s appeal to political science off of Schmitt’s appeal to 
political theology. 
Schmitt faults legality for lacking attention to life. But that charge cannot be 
leveled against law conceived as rhetoric. One fact of life is the need to act. Even 
though human beings inevitably fall short of their aspiration to base actions on 
rationality, not instinct, we still need to act. As a result, in many situations, we 
have learned to rely on rhetoric, whose “axiom,” Blumenberg argues, is “the 
principle of insufficient reason.”144 This is especially true of law in which norms 
need to be established and decisions rendered with no certainty as to what is right. 
Rhetoric’s function helps account for the limits of thinking of law as science, 
not only in Burgess’s case, but also in present efforts to draw on the “science” of 
economics. For example, describing his position as juridical skepticism, Judge 
Richard Posner admits that the law is not an autonomous discipline that can find 
within itself grounds for legal policy. He then goes on to seek those grounds in 
economics.145 But sophisticated modern scientists know that their knowledge is 
 
139. Id. at 695. 
140. Id. at 699. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Brook Thomas, Reflections on the Law and Literature Revival, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 510, 511 
(1991). 
144. Hans Blumenberg, An Anthropological Approach to the Contemporary Significance of Rhetoric, in 
AFTER PHILOSOPHY: END OR TRANSFORMATION? 429, 447 (Kenneth Baynes et al. eds., 1987). 
145. Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 890–91 (1988). 
           
262 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:239 
not certain. Thus, the scientific community has learned “to put up with the 
provisional character of its results indefinitely.”146 Law cannot afford that luxury. 
The results of science can, and probably should, be appealed to, but because they 
are always provisional, we still need to ask whether they should be the basis for 
legal actions. The authority for legal action, in other words, is always open to 
rhetorical dispute, a rhetoric that is not controlled by transcendental principles or 
scientific laws. “The decisive difference” between rhetoric and science, according 
to Blumenberg, “lies in the dimension of time; science can wait, or is subject to 
the convention of being able to wait, whereas rhetoric . . . presupposes, as a 
constitutive element of its situation” the necessity to act while “[l]acking definitive 
evidence.”147 
Of course, Schmitt’s political theology understands the need to act. An 
advocate of decisionism, Schmitt argues that to understand a legal system we must 
look to the decisions made, not the norms articulated. Nonetheless, for him the 
answer does not lie in rhetoric. On the contrary, he is part of a long antirhetorical, 
antidemocratic tradition beginning with Plato. Schmitt is, for instance, strongly 
influenced by Hobbes, who objected to democracy because it relies on rhetoric to 
make decisions more “by a certain violence of mind” than by a right reason.148 
Likewise, in The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1923), Schmitt criticizes modern 
mass democracies for their partisan politics. Disgusted with people whose primary 
loyalty seems to be to their political parties rather than the good of the state, he 
accuses them of being unwilling to “concede the force of the better argument.”149 
Thus, Schmitt turns to a single individual, the president—elected by all of the 
people—as the defender of the constitution, granting him the sovereign power to 
declare the state of exception. 
Schmitt’s state of exception might seem to point to the limits of rhetoric. If 
it makes sense to understand law as rhetoric rather than science because of the 
need to act, an emergency demands action that cannot wait for rhetorical 
deliberation. Nonetheless, a flaw in Schmitt’s argument becomes apparent if we 
turn to Burgess. Like Schmitt, Burgess recognizes that the initial response and 
reaction to an emergency must come from the executive, who in such cases has 
“despotic power.”150 Criticizing the majority decision in Ex parte Milligan for 
allowing local courts to decide the state of emergency, he writes that it 
would place in the hands of a relatively insignificant and irresponsible 
official the power of life and death over the state, in times of its greatest 
peril. War is the solution of a question by force; and this proposition 
would introduce into the process, at its most critical point, the pettiest 
kind of legalism. Scientifically, the view is weak and narrow; practically, it 
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cannot be realized. The commander has only to close the court-room, 
and place a guard at the door, and this criterion of war or peace will be 
made to conform to the determinations of power.151 
With its realistic understanding of the “determinations of power” and its 
attack on the “pettiest kind of legalism,” this account could well be written by 
Schmitt. But, unlike Schmitt, Burgess does not grant the president sovereignty. 
The president may be the first to act but that does not mean that his actions are in 
the end legitimate. “[I]f Congress wills otherwise,” Burgess points out, “it has the 
constitutional power to render the president’s act null and void, to treat it as an 
usurpation and to remove him from his office.”152 
Alluding here as much to Congress’s battles with President Johnson over 
Reconstruction as to Lincoln, Burgess’s example reveals his affinity, if not total 
agreement, with advocates of rule by law, such as Bruce Ackerman and David 
Cole, who insist that the decision to end emergency power should not rest with 
those who exercise it.153 Acutely attuned to the need to act decisively, Burgess also 
knows that the person charged with an initial response need not be considered 
sovereign. This crucial difference between Burgess and Schmitt reveals a problem 
with the latter’s claims about political theology. Rather than provide an accurate 
description of a historical process, Schmitt’s argument about the state’s use of 
secularized theological concepts turns out to be a rhetorical ploy to legitimate his 
authoritarian desire to give a single individual sovereign control over partisan 
politics. Indeed, Schmitt’s American examples reveal the historical inaccuracy of 
his argument about political theology. For instance, he asserts that nineteenth-
century Americans believed that “the voice of the people is the voice of God.”154 
But Lieber explicitly states that “‘Vox populi, vox Dei,’ cannot be endorsed.”155 
Even more telling is Schmitt’s claim that “[t]he exception in jurisprudence is 
analogous to the miracle in theology.”156 Just as deism “banished the miracle from 
the world,”157 so rationalist defenders of the “modern constitutional state”158 
refuse to acknowledge the necessity of the exception.159 But what are we to do 
with Burgess, a rationalist defender of the modernist constitutional state if there 
ever was one, and his defense of the exception? One thing I hope is that we use 
him to note the audacity of Schmitt’s comparison of the sovereign’s declaration of 
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martial law with a divine miracle. Schmitt’s claims for political theology depend on 
such analogies. 
Acknowledging that dependency, Bonnie Honig affirms Schmitt’s metaphor 
of the exception as a miracle but offers a different version of political theology by 
drawing on Franz Rosenzweig’s account of miracle while extolling the “miracle of 
metaphor.”160 But over forty years ago, Blumenberg offered a different way of 
understanding Schmitt metaphorically. Noting Schmitt’s assertion that “[a]ll my 
statements on the subject of political theology have been the assertions of a legal 
scholar about a systematic structural kinship between theological and juristic 
concepts,”161 Blumenberg points out that a structural kinship is not necessarily a 
relation of secularization. Secularization occurs when concepts that are originally 
theological determine how a realm outside of theology conceives of itself. But in 
Schmitt’s case the terms he uses are “not determined by the system of what is 
available for borrowing but rather by the requirements of the situation in which 
the choice is being made.”162 The theological tradition makes available to Schmitt 
metaphors that allow him to create an aura of legitimacy for his authoritarian 
views of sovereignty. Thus, Schmitt’s “[p]olitical theology,” Blumenberg 
concludes, “is a metaphoric theology: the quasi-divine person of the sovereign 
possesses legitimacy, and has to possess it, because for him there is no longer 
legality, or not yet, since he has first to constitute or to reconstitute it.”163 
Schmitt may use metaphorical theology rather than political theology to 
legitimate his theory of sovereignty, but at least its results are concrete. We have 
no doubt who is sovereign. In contrast, Burgess’s use of “science” to legitimate 
the sovereignty of the state seems hopelessly abstract. As important as Burgess’s 
distinction between the government and the state is, it leaves us unclear about 
what precisely constitutes the state. Who or what actually imposes the limit? 
Wilson noted this problem. A Democrat of his time, he was much more 
sympathetic to the doctrine of “states’ rights” than Burgess.164 But he does not go 
so far as to grant individual states sovereignty. Making a fine distinction, he grants 
them “dominion,” reserving “sovereignty” for the federal state.165 He does not 
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stop there. For him, sovereignty cannot be located by general reference to the 
state, as it can for Burgess.166 Sovereignty is, instead, “the highest political power 
in the state.”167 For Wilson, this means “the highest originative or law-making 
body of the state.”168 By granting sovereignty to the “law-making organ” of the 
state, Wilson self-consciously counters ideas of popular sovereignty.169 To be sure, 
he admits, 
In a very profound sense law proceeds from the community. . . . But law 
issues thus from the body of the community only in vague and inchoate 
form. It must be taken out of the sphere of voluntary and uncertain 
action and made precise and invariable. It becomes positive law by 
receiving definition and being backed by an active and recognized power 
within the state.170 
Wilson locates sovereignty in the law-making organ of the state. Schmitt 
locates it in the president. The concreteness of both highlights the vagueness of 
Burgess’s theory. But, before we dismiss Burgess’s notion of the state as a 
hopeless metaphysical abstraction, it is worth trying to ascertain the rhetorical role 
it plays within his system. That role, I would like to suggest, is very similar to the 
role legal fictions play in the law. Necessary to allow a legal system to function, 
legal fictions are one more reminder that the law cannot construct its own rational 
foundation. To be sure, Burgess would have resisted that comparison, since he 
believed that science had allowed him to transcend the scaffolding of fictions. In 
contrast, Schmitt had an astute awareness of their necessity. In one of his first 
publications, he defines a fiction as a “self-consciously arbitrary or false 
assumption” whose “value and justification” lie in “its unavoidable 
indispensability for the practice of thought and communication.”171 As we have 
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seen, rhetorically Schmitt’s account of sovereignty as political theology helps him 
create a myth of legitimacy for the decisive actions of an individual over the 
muddled workings of partisan politics. 
Burgess’s account of sovereignty functions very differently. His failure to 
name with precision what constitutes the state makes his account uncannily 
compatible with William Connolly’s very up-to-date critique of Schmitt and 
Agamben. According to Connolly, we need to think of sovereignty without a 
definite location; we need to think of sovereignty with no doer behind the deed. 
Not located in one person or governmental body, sovereignty for Connolly is an 
assemblage of various actors and comes into being only after sovereign acts have 
been performed.172 If this sounds paradoxical, it is, constituting what Connolly 
and Bonnie Honig call the generative “paradox of politics.”173 In Burgess’s hands, 
that paradox allows him to limit governmental power by granting unlimited power 
to the state. Indeed, as counterintuitive as it is for critics of state power, for 
Burgess the legal fiction of the state serves an equitable function. 
Like Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty, equity is concerned with the 
exception. Acknowledging that law, a product of human beings, is inevitably 
flawed, Aristotle introduced the concept of equity to provide remedies for those 
cases in which the norms of even fair systems can produce injustices. But, because 
it deals with the exceptional, equity can never be properly institutionalized. As a 
result, especially in English-speaking countries, equity was traditionally associated 
with the Crown, since only the sovereign was considered to have the authority to 
disregard human-made law to deal with exceptional cases. Schmitt’s link between 
the sovereign and the exception works within the same conceptual framework, 
and, although attempts to institutionalize equity inevitably fail, we have residues of 
the old system. Richard Posner, for instance, in one of his most decisionist 
moments, claims that equitable remedies are available through the discretionary 
power of judges.174 More directly, the former link between equity and the 
sovereign accounts for the pardoning power granted to the president in the 
Constitution. It is no accident that Lincoln, who declared exceptional powers 
during wartime, also had a reputation as the great pardoner. But the most 
important role that equity plays today is rhetorical. Even without actual 
institutions of equity, the metaphor remains, marking the limits to the law and 
providing a perspective to criticize unjust outcomes. For Burgess, the sovereign 
state—which marks the limits of both law and the government—serves that 
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function, allowing him to criticize specific laws, Supreme Court decisions, and 
governmental actions while still defending the modern Rechtstaat. 
Although equity points to a limit of law, equity has its own limitations when 
it comes to assuring justice. As noble as appeals to it sound, there is no agreement 
about what is equitable. Thus, when George Washington Cable responded to the 
civil rights cases in 1883 by arguing for equal citizenship for African Americans in 
an essay called “The Freedman’s Case in Equity,” Henry Grady responded with 
“In Plain Black and White,” claiming that the truly equitable solution was separate 
but equal segregation.175 Burgess’s sovereign state may serve an equitable function, 
but there is no guarantee that it is in fact equitable. What is equitable is always 
open to rhetorical debate. 
Indeed, Burgess is not the only one to use the “legal fiction” of the state 
rhetorically. When Berman claims that political theology serves as the “marker of 
the inescapable limitation on politics and state power,” what he really means is 
governmental power exercised in the name of the state. But for Berman to argue 
for limitations on governmental power would be to sound very much like the 
liberalism he rejects. To give one example, a 1946 Life editorial characterizes 
liberalism by its beliefs that government needs to acknowledge some outside limit 
to its power and that no political system—not even those based on rationality—
can offer perfect answers.176 To make a case for limitations on governmental 
power would also require attention to different organs of the government, such as 
the executive, legislative, and judicial, as well as (in the United States) the national 
and state governments. As the examples from the post-Civil War era amply 
demonstrate, these different organs are often in conflict. In contrast, to call for 
limits on “state” power allows the construction of simplified narratives about 
power emanating from a unified source. For instance, in their influential book 
about race in the United States, Omi and Winant assert—without proving—
“Despite all the forces working at cross-purposes within the state . . . the state still 
preserves an overall unity.”177 No one responsive to the complicated legal history 
of race and Reconstruction, with its conflict between the sovereignty of the 
national state and individual states, could make that statement. 
My point is not that we need to eliminate the legal fiction of the state. On 
the contrary, I find Agamben as naïve as Burgess on the possibility of doing 
without fictions when, in The State of Exception, he argues that the answer to the 
abuse of power is to “halt the machine” that “is leading the West toward global 
civil war,” by exposing the “fiction” of the “very concepts of state and law.”178 If 
fictions are necessary, exposing them as fictions will not eliminate them. What we 
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can do, however, is try our best to understand the function of different fictions of 
the state. Rhetorically, they can serve both proponents of state power, like 
Burgess, and critics of state power influenced by Schmitt, like Berman, because 
both need some way to mark limits. Thus, I want to close with a brief comparison 
of the rhetorical effects of Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty in terms of the 
exception and Burgess’s in terms of the limit, followed by a look at three 
controversial legal issues today in which, it seems to me, Burgess’s definition 
proves more helpful than Schmitt’s. 
VI. 
“Exception” implies a norm. An Ausnahme, it is the “taking out” of an 
example that does not fit. Its connotations are primarily temporal, as indicated by 
another German term, Ausnahmefall, which means an “exceptional incident.” This 
temporal dimension served Schmitt’s purposes well since he felt that the situation 
in Germany had become an Ausnahmezustand, a “state of emergency,” requiring the 
declaration of martial law. In contrast, “limitation’s” connotations are equally 
spatial and temporal. We have limits to a territory as well as to time. The spatial 
dimension served Burgess well in post-Civil War debates over whether the nation 
or “states” should have jurisdiction over a particular territory. The temporal 
dimension allowed his theory of sovereignty to accommodate the state of 
emergency. To be sure, the temporal and the spatial are not in strict opposition. 
Schmitt, for instance, calls his definition a Grenzbegriff, a border concept, with 
Grenze meaning a border or a limit.179 For Schmitt, the exception marks the limit 
of attempts to base rule by law on a set of rational norms. 
In the post-9/11 world, Agamben has drawn on Schmitt to argue that the 
exception has become the norm. That view is encouraged by the English 
translation of Political Theology, which uses “exception” to refer to Schmitt’s varying 
deployment of Ausnahme, Ausnahmefall, and Ausnahmezustand. Thus, although 
Schmitt’s definition of the sovereign refers to the very specific case of the 
Ausnahmezustand, it comes across in English as referring to the exception in 
general. As much as the rhetoric of Schmitt’s argument encourages the conflation 
of these three terms, the English translation is unfortunate. After all, it is one thing 
to note that we are in exceptional times. It is quite another to say that those times 
are so exceptional that martial law must be declared. Despite numerous 
descriptions of the country being in a perpetual state of emergency, I follow Hans 
Kellner in arguing that we should not, as Schmitt and his followers tend to do, 
collapse the productive tension between the exception and the norm by turning 
the exception into the norm. Capable of accommodating temporary moments of 
the state of exception without jettisoning the important function of normativity in 
the law, Burgess’s much more conventional definition of sovereignty in terms of 
the limit seems to be more productive in today’s world. 
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If the exception implies a norm, limitation implies something “above or 
beyond” that can impose the limit. In a Christian context that thing was God. 
Thus, Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake over the idea of infinity, the 
possibility that the world of the here and now has no limits. Despite Schmitt’s 
claims about political theology, however, Burgess’s sovereign state does not 
function in the same manner as God. With unlimited authority, God knows no 
bounds. In contrast, Burgess’s state is bounded. It has unlimited authority only 
over a limited territory. That authority is beneficial for those living within that 
territory, Burgess believed, because of the legal norms that govern it. But those 
norms do not apply to people beyond the limits of the state’s jurisdiction. For at 
least three controversial constitutional issues in today’s America, injustice is more 
likely to be perpetuated by limiting—even relinquishing—sovereignty than by 
asserting it in Schmittian fashion. 
My first example is the detention and trying of terrorist suspects at 
Guantanamo. Despite clarification in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), a 
number of people continue to believe that the denial of full constitutional 
protections to the accused resulted from a sovereign assertion of the “exception.” 
On the contrary, the Bush administration’s legal argument was based on the fact 
that, because Guantanamo is leased and not technically sovereign U.S. territory, 
full constitutional guarantees were not required. Historically, it is important to 
remember that the lease for Guantanamo grew out of the imperialism of the 
Spanish-American War. Although it did not acquire Cuba, the United States 
arranged for the permanent lease of a naval base there. In the meantime, in the 
Insular Cases, the Supreme Court gave Congress plenary power over the 
territories the nation did acquire, denying their residents full constitutional 
protections because the territories were not fully incorporated into the country.180 
Given Burgess’s defense of the state’s unlimited sovereign power, it might seem 
that he would have endorsed the Court. On the contrary, he was outraged, 
appalled that it did not honor the sovereign duty to protect the civil liberties of all 
within its territory.181 Understanding this logic, the Bush administration 
recognized that the best way to deny constitutional protections was to relinquish a 
claim to sovereignty, not to assert it. 
The fact that imperial expansion relies on the assertion of sovereignty at the 
same time that relinquishment of it can lead to what many consider human rights 
abuses should make it clear that state power is neither the benevolent force that 
Burgess posits nor the unmitigated evil that its critics decry. Even the use of 
 
180. A number of Americans assume that the absence of judicial review makes plenary power 
an example of the state of exception. It is not. The state of exception is a state of emergency when the 
civil legal order is suspended as in martial law. Plenary power is a particular form of administrative 
law. 
181. John W. Burgess, How May the United States Govern Its Extra-Continental Territories?, 14 POL. 
SCI. Q. 1, 3 (1899); John W. Burgess, The Decisions of the Supreme Court in the Insular Cases, 16 POL. SCI. 
Q. 486, 498–504 (1901); Burgess, supra note 152, at 382–83. 
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emergency powers is double edged. Although its potential for abuse is obvious, in 
the Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction period it was used to combat the Ku 
Klux Klan and, as Birkheimer makes clear, to protect Chinese immigrants from 
lynching. Indeed, one reason this period is so helpful for a consideration of issues 
of sovereignty is that it dramatizes a paradox that continues to have consequences 
today. On the one hand, Reconstruction failed in large measure because the 
national state, for various reasons, did not fully assert the sovereignty it won in the 
Civil War over individual “states.” On the other, when it asserted that sovereignty 
in immigration, Native American affairs, and the Spanish-American War, it 
frequently did so with great injustice.182 
Involving immigration, my second example shows the extent to which we 
are still living in the wake of that paradox. Prior to the Chinese Exclusion Acts, a 
national state apparatus to control immigration barely existed. Indeed, individual 
states alone often handled immigration. But with the Acts of 1882 and 1892 the 
national government asserted control and claimed the right both to exclude and to 
deport aliens. When Chinese protested, the Supreme Court, citing the doctrine of 
national sovereignty, sided with the government. Burgess fully agreed, appealing to 
a state’s right to protect “its nationality against the deleterious influences of 
foreign immigration.”183 But there was an unexpected consequence of this 
assertion of unlimited sovereignty. In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 
(1898), the U.S. government tried to deny birthright citizenship to the son of a 
Chinese couple living in San Francisco. Wong Kim Ark pointed to the citizenship 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, noting that he had been born in this 
country. But the government argued that, because his parents were subjects of 
China, he was not, as the amendment requires, fully subject to U.S. jurisdiction. 
Indeed, it was no accident that the government’s attorney was an ex-Confederate 
who continued to believe in limitations on national sovereignty. In contrast, Wong 
Kim Ark’s lawyers cited pro-Reconstruction Charles Sumner and the need for one 
supreme sovereignty.184 The Court agreed with Wong Kim Ark. Today, those 
wanting to deny birthright citizenship to children of illegal immigrants dispute the 
ruling in Wong Kim Ark. They do so by adopting an argument similar to that of the 
ex-Confederate governmental attorney in 1898. They too deny the national state 
unlimited sovereign authority over all of the people in its territory. 
My final example deals with another provision of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Some important Reconstruction cases defining the relation between 
 
182. Constitutionally this divide can be traced to the Slaughter House Cases. See Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). By defining the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship so 
narrowly, the Supreme Court left the control of many domestic relations to individual states. But the 
national government still—and with increased authority—governed relations with immigrants, Native 
American tribes, and other countries. 
183. 1 BURGESS, supra note 16, at 43. 
184. Lucy E. Salyer, Wong Kim Ark: The Contest Over Birthright Citizenship, in IMMIGRATION 
STORIES 51, 73 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005). 
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the nation and the individual state, such as Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1869), had 
to do with the debt the Confederate government and individual states accrued 
during the Civil War. Given Lincoln’s legal fiction that states had never left the 
union, those debts raised a thorny legal issue. As a result, Section 4 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment unconditionally recognizes the “validity of the public 
debt of the United States” while forbidding the United States or any individual 
state from assuming or paying “any debt or obligation incurred in aid of 
insurrection or rebellion against the United States.”185 As with other measures of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 4 affirms national sovereignty. Indeed, as 
frequent references to “sovereign debt” to describe today’s financial crisis in the 
Eurozone confirm, a crucial component of sovereignty is control of a nation’s 
debt. Much of the resentment from Greek citizens, for instance, comes from their 
sense that the European Union is imposing limits on how their country deals with 
its debt. Thus, when in 2012 Republicans threatened not to honor the U.S. debt, 
they were, in effect, arguing to limit U.S. sovereignty. To be sure, some might 
claim that the size of the debt has become such a crisis that the Constitution 
should be disregarded and a state of emergency declared. We might, then, turn to 
Schmitt to ask who has the power to declare such an emergency. But the very 
question points to a problem with his definition of sovereignty. Even though 
massive debt contributed to the crisis of the Weimar government, it is unlikely 
that even Schmitt would have wanted to attribute that “sovereign debt” to the 
individual declaring an Ausnahmezustand. 
I hope that this and other examples I have raised through my historically 
based rhetorical analysis have persuaded at least some that, as indebted to Schmitt 
as we are for provocative questions about sovereignty, there are major limitations 
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